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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Survey period I generated several important cases in the ADR arena, 
in particular cases dealing with the enforcement of arbitration agreements. 
The Michigan Court of Appeals published seven opinions addressing ADR.2 
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals published two opinions, one involving 
arbitrability and the second relating to adhesion contracts and 
unconscionability. Several of these decisions represent important 
clarifications in ADR jurisprudence. The majority of decisions, however, 
come as no surprise. The appellate decisions are well-analyzed and clear in 
their import, offering useful guidelines for ADR practitioners and neutrals. 
t Professor of Law in Residence and Director, ADR Program, Michigan State 
University College of Law, B.A. 1971, Wayne State University; M.A. 1975, Wayne State 
University; J.D. 1980, Detroit College of Law. The author gratefully acknowledges the 
financial support of Michigan State University College of Law, the skillful research 
assistance of Julie A. Burke, J.D., May 2006, and the technical library assistance of Jane 
Edwards, J.D., M.I.L.S., Janet Ann Hedin, J.D., and Lynn Sorenson, M.L.S. Finally, the 
author would like to thank the faculty and administration at Michigan State University 
College of Law, whose insights, vision, and support of the ADR Program have aided 
immeasurably in its shaping. 
1. The Survey period covers cases decided from June I, 2004 through May 31, 2005. 
One case, A/ticor, Inc. v. Nat'/ Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 411 F.3d 669 (6th Cir. 
2005), falls outside the Survey period, but is discussed in this article (see pp. 330-31). 
2. The Michigan Court of Appeals also issued over seventy unpublished decisions 
involving either mediation or arbitration. Of these, twenty-three are noteworthy. Selected 
unpublished cases appear in the APPENDIX attached to this article (see pp. 348-54). 
325 
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From this tapestry of cases, there is a single resounding theme-both the 
Michigan Court of Appeals and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals continue 
to articulate a liberal policy favoring mediation and arbitration as effective 
alternatives to the traditional adjudicatory process. 
II. ARBITRABILITY 
As a general rule in arbitration, only disputes that parties agree to 
arbitrate may be arbitrated.3 The underlying rationale is that since 
arbitration is in derogation of the common law, it requires consent.4 
Arbitrable disputes take one of two forms-procedural or substantive. s The 
distinction is important to practitioners. Procedural issues of arbitration, 
such as the statute oflimitation, laches, etc., are for the arbitrator to decide. 6 
Substantive arbitrability goes to the issue of whether the parties have agreed 
to arbitrate the disputed claim in the first instance and is decided by the 
court.7 
3. St. Clair Prosecutorv. American Fed'n of State, County and Municipal Employees, 
425 Mich. 204,233; 388 N.W.2d 231, 239 (1986) (quoted with approval in Hetrick v. 
Friedman, 237 Mich. App. 264, 266-267, 602 N.W.2d 603, 605-606 (1999)) ("[A] party 
cannot be required to arbitrate an issue which he has not agreed to submit to arbitration ... 
[and] a party cannot be required to arbitrate when it is not legally or factually a party to the 
agreement."); see also Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. 537 U.S. 79 (2002); AT & 
T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of America, 475 U.S. 643, 648 (1986); 
Detroit Typographical Union v. Detroit Newspaper Agency, 283 F.3d 779, 786 (6th Cir. 
2002) (standing collectively for the proposition that arbitration can be compelled only if the 
parties have agreed to arbitrate the particular controversy involved). 
4. Michigan's arbitration statute, which is found in Chapter 50 of the Revised 
Judicature Act of 1961, requires a writing agreeing to arbitrate and containing a provision 
for enforcement of the award in a court of competent jurisdiction. 
5. See Arrow Overall Supply Co. v. Peloquin Enterprises, 414 Mich. 95, 323 N.W.2d 
1 (1992); Litton Financial Printing Division v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190 (1991). 
6. See John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 555-556 (1964) ("Once 
it is determined [by a court] that the parties are obligated to submit the subject matter of a 
dispute to arbitration, 'procedural' questions which grow out of the dispute and bear on its 
final disposition should be left to the arbitrator."); see also Bennett v. Shearson Lehman-
AmericanExpress, Inc., 168 Mich. App. 80, 83,423 N.W.2d 911, 912-913 (1987) ("[W]here 
substantive issues of a dispute are proper subjects for arbitration, procedural matters arising 
out of the dispute are for the arbitrator and not the courts to determine.). For an excellent 
discussion of the conundrum this dichotomy presents for practitioners see Crone, The 
Continuing Battle Over Procedural Issue: Is it a Decision/or the Courts or the Arbitrator?, 
20 MEM. ST. L. REv. 145 (1989). 
7. See Peloquin Enterprises, 414 Mich. at 99; 323 N. W.2d at 2-3 ("The existence of a 
contract to arbitrate and the enforceability of its terms is a judicial question which cannot 
be decided by an arbitrator."); see also NLRB, 501 U.S. at 208 ("Whether a (party) ... is 
bound to a arbitrate, as well as what issues it must arbitrate, is a matter to be determined by 
the court, and a party cannot be forced to 'arbitrate the arbitrability issue. "'). 
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In Fromm v. Meemic Insurance Company,8 the Michigan Court of 
Appeals re-affinned its view respecting arbitrability that the existence of an 
arbitration agreement and the enforceability of its tenns are judicial 
questions for the courts, not the arbitrators.9 Once a court determines that 
arbitration is proper, the task of deciding the case on the merits is turned 
over to the arbitrator. lo 
The insureds, husband and wife, alleged that an automobile accident 
caused the wife to have a miscarriage. 11 The parties' insurance policy 
contained an arbitration clause. 12 When the insurance company disputed the 
miscarriage as a compensable injury under the tenns of the policy, the 
insureds invoked arbitration. 13 The insurance company failed to participate 
in the selection of the arbitrator, instead asserting that the policy's tenns 
precluded arbitration with respect to disagreements concerning coverage. 14 
The insureds then filed a complaint in which they claimed that by 
failing to participate in the arbitration process, the insurance company was 
in breach of the policy. IS Defendant insurer responded by filing a 
counterclaim for declaratory relief, alleging that the insured wife did not 
suffer bodily injury that resulted in death, serious impainnent of body 
function, or pennanent serious disfigurement, requisite thresholds to trigger 
the obligation to pay.16 The trial court granted the insurer's motion for 
summary disposition, agreeing with the insurer that even if the miscarriage 
was caused by the accident, the insured wife had not sustained a serious 
impainnent of an important body function, since the miscarriage did not 
affect her general ability to lead a nonnal life. 17 
In a split opinion, the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed, holding that 
an arbitrator must decide whether the plaintiff has suffered a compensable 
injury.18 The appellate court began its analysis by observing that under 
Michigan law, questions pertaining to the actual existence of an arbitration 
8. Fromm v. Meemic Ins. Co., 264 Mich. App. 302, 690 N.W.2d 528 (2004). 
9.Id. at 305, 690 N.W.2d at 530. 
10. Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960). But see Camden 
Indus. Co. v. Carpenters Local 1688, 353 F.2d 178,180 (1st Cir. 1965) (holding that where 
arbitrability cannot be determined without delving into the merits, the entire matter is 
submitted to the arbitrator to decide "the subsidiary facts uponwhichdependboththe merits 
of the controversy and his jurisdiction to decide it. "). 
11. Fromm, 264 Mich. App. At 303-04,690 N.W.2d at 529-30. 
12. See id. at 304,690 N.W.2d at 530. 
13.Id. 
14.Id. at 304-05,690 N.W.2d at 530. 
15.Id. 
16. !d. 
17. Fromm, 264 Mich. App. at 304-05,690 N.W.2d at 530. 
18.Id. at 308, 690 N.W.2d at 532. 
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agreement are to be resolved by courts, not arbitrators. 19 The important rule 
in arbitration is to deduce the intentions of the parties, specifically whether 
parties intended for certain disputes to be arbitrated. In Michigan, intent for 
arbitration purposes is measured by a three-part test. "To ascertain the 
arbitrability of an issue, [a] court must consider whether there is an 
arbitration provision in the parties' contract, whether the dispute issue is 
arguably within the arbitration clause, and whether the dispute is expressly 
exempt from arbitration by the terms of the contract. "20 Conflicts should be 
resolved in favor of arbitration.21 
According to the appellate court, the term "coverage" referred to the 
formation and existence of the contract and not to whether the issue of the 
miscarriage was a compensable injury.22 To decide otherwise would render 
the arbitration clause a virtual nullity, since the insurer could easily avoid 
arbitration merely by raising a coverage question.23 Furthermore, this 
construction "s imply reinforces the court's role as gatekeeper to the 
arbitration process and leaves the actual resolution of particular disputes 
with the arbitrator-just as the parties intended.24 
The court of appeals stressed two additional points. First, bifurcating 
disputes defeats the underlying purpose of arbitration, which is to resolve 
claims quickly and efficiently.25 Invoking litigation at the outset is an 
unwise use of judicial resources, and splits the decision-making function 
unnecessarily between several fora. 26 Moreover, parties cannot through 
contract assign new roles for public institutions.27 In other words, parties 
cannot delegate a new function to the courts that is not provided by court 
rule or statute. This would undermine another feature of 
arbitration-fmality of resolution. 
Judge Murphy dissented from the majority opinion, arguing that the 
language of the insurance policy precluded arbitration since there was no 
express written consent to arbitrate matters of coverage, as required by the 
contract. 28 "An insurance contract is deemed ambiguous when its provisions 
19.Id. at 305,690 N.W.2d at 530 citing Huntington Woodsy. AjaxPaving Industries, 
Inc., 196 Mich. App. 71, 74, 492 N.W.2d 463, 464 (1992). 
20. Fromm. at 305-06, 609 N.W.2d at 530 citing Huntington Woods, 196 Mich. App. 
at 74-75, 492 N.W.2d at 464. 
21. Id. at 306,690 N.W.2d at 53l. 
22. Id. at 307-08, 690 N. W.2d at 531-32. 
23.Id. 
24. !d. at 308,690 N.W.2d at 532. 
25.Id. at 306, 690 N.W.2d at 531. 
26.Id. 
27.Id. 
28.Id. at 308,690 N.W.2d at 532. 
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are capable of interpretations that conflict,"29 a conflict the majority found 
to be glaringly absent in this case. The dissent criticized the majority's 
relianc e on Brucker v. McKinlay Transport, Inc. 30 in which the Michigan 
Supreme Court held that "a court should not interpret a contract's language 
beyond determining whether arbitration applies and should not allow the 
parties to divide their disputes between the court and an arbitrator.'>31 
According to Judge Murphy, footnote 9 of Brucker indicates that as a 
general proposition, parties may contract to have some controversies dealt 
with in arbitration while also agreeing to have other controversies resolved 
in a court of law.32 This construction is consistent with Michigan law.33 
Although the dissent did not rule the day, the question presented in 
Fromm triggers a jurisprudential quagmire. If insurance companies want to 
avoid arbitration, they could simply raise the issue as one of "coverage. '>34 
In this scenario, arbitration would be catapulted to an 'illusory' right. On 
the other hand, the importance of freedom of contract and party intent 
cannot be underestimated. To be sure, the majority's ruling is more 
compelling and consistent with the rules of statutory construction. If the 
insurance company intended for certain issues to be excluded from 
coverage, it could have chosen to provide so explicitly. Also, the dissent's 
interpretation of Brucker is misplaced. In Brucker, the parties' contract 
provided that disputes by the buyer regarding accounting matters would be 
submitted to arbitration, with questions of contract interpretation 
determined by the circuit court. 35 The Michigan Supreme Court held that 
the arbitration agreement was invalid because it called for questions of 
contract interpretation to be decided by the circuit court, in violation of the 
limited role circumscribed by statute and court rule. 36 Essentially, the 
Michigan Supreme Court stated that parties could not use the statute and the 
court rule to require courts to "issue advisory opinions to guide the 
arbitrator through the more difficult portions of the task. "37 Fromm, 
however, presented a traditional issue of arbitrability-whether the parties 
intended to arbitrate or litigate the issue of serious impairment. 
Despite the strong public policy supporting arbitration, courts are not 
reluctant to protect their turf when legitimate questions of contractual intent 
29.Id. at 311, 690 N.W.2d at 533. 
30. Brucker v. McKinlay Transport, Inc., 454 Mich. 8, 557 N.W.2d 536 (1997). 
31. Fromm, 264 Mich. App. at 306, 690 N.W.2d at 531. 
32.Id. at 314-15, 690 N.W.2d at 535. 
33. See MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 600.5001(2) (2000). 
34. Fromm, 264 Mich. App. at 307,690 N.W.2d at 531. 
35. See Brucker, 454 Mich. at 9-14,557 N.W.2d at 536-38. 
36.Id. at 17, 557 N.W.2d at 540. 
37. Fromm, 264 Mich. App. at 313, 690 N.W.2d at 535. 
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arise. A case which illustrates the limits of arbitrability is Alticor, Inc. v. 
National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh,38 decided by the Sixth 
Circuit in June 2005. National Union Fire Insurance Company (''National 
Union") issued a general liability insurance policy to Alticor.39 The policy 
limited National Union's liability for each occurrence that led to a claim.40 
The parties also had an ancillary agreement, referred to as a Premium 
Payment Agreement, which defmed Alticor's obligations and 
responsibilities in making payments to National Union.41 This agreement 
contained an arbitration clause providing that any dispute "arising out of or 
relating to" the Premium Payment Agreement would be subject to binding 
arbitration.42 There was no similar arbitration provision in the actual 
insurance policy.43 After a dispute arose regarding the meaning of the term 
"occurrence," National Union moved to compel arbitration.44 The district 
court denied National Union's motion to compel, and an appeal followed.45 
The issue before the Sixth Circuit was whether the meaning of the term 
"occurrence" in the insurance policy actually "arises out of or relates to" the 
Premium Payment Agreement.46 Although the appellate court recognized 
the FAA's liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, the court 
of appeals also emphasized that the FAA requires courts to enforce 
privately negotiated arbitration agreements as any other contract, in 
accordance with its terms.47 Here, the insurance policy defmed the 
substantive rights and duties of the parties to the agreement. 48 In contrast, 
the ancillary agreement discussed the mechanics and the formalities of the 
premium payment.49 National Union effectively narrowed the types of 
disputes to be submitted to arbitration by drafting the ancillary agreement's 
arbitration provision to encompass only those disputes arising from the 
38. Alticor, Inc. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 411 F.3d 669 (6th Cir. 
2005). 
39. !d. at 670. 
40. !d. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. at 670-71. 
43.Id. at 670. 
44. Alticor, 411 F.3d at 670. 
45.Id. 
46. !d. at 671. 
47.Id. at 673; see also EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279,294 (2002) (stating 
that the court should not reach an inconsistent result with the plain text of a contract simply 
because of the policy favoring arbitration); Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of the 
Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989). 
48. Alticor, 411 F.3d at 671. 
49.Id. 
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ancillary agreement. 50 Since the Premium Payment Agreement only referred 
to payment procedures but not any substantive issues, the controversy was 
not arbitrable. 51 
A sharp dissent by Judge Gilman followed.52 In opposing the majority 
view, Judge Gilman stated that the reimbursement amount is a "function of 
the means by which the deductible amount is determined"; the calculated 
amount is a function of the substantive issue, thus the dispute should be 
arbitrated according to the arbitration provision in the ancillary agreement. 53 
The dissent characterized the majority's distinction between the two 
agreements as "hairsplitting," stating that the result was entirely inconsistent 
with the overarching federal policy in support of arbitration. 54 
The result in this case illustrates the limits of the federal policy favoring 
arbitration, and confirms that a court is not likely to peer into the mindset 
of contracting parties to locate the requisite 'intent'. Intent is construed 
from the drafted documents, unless the documents are ambiguous. As a 
cautionary note, practitioners should exercise great care in crafting multiple 
agreements to ensure that ADR provisions, if inserted, mean what the 
parties intend. 
III. ENFORCEABILITY OF AGREEMENTS TO AABITRA TE 
Since Gilmer5 was decided by the United States Supreme Court in 
1991, an increasing number of employment claims are being submitted to 
arbitration. Many of these claims are subject to arbitration by virtue of a 
personnel policy or an employment handbook provision that requires 
employees to submit any and all claims that arise out of the employment 
relationship to arbitration. While the appropriateness of arbitration is 
generally not an issue, what is often controversial is the manner in which 
50. Id. at 672. 
51. Id. at 673. 
52.Id. at 674-75 (Gilman, J., dissenting). 
53. !d. at 674. 
54. Altico;; 411 F.3d at 675, citing Highlands Wellmont Hlth. Net. Inc. v. John Deere 
Health Plan, Inc\350 F.3d 568,56-77 (6th Cir. 2003). 
55.500 U.S. 20 (1991). In this 7-2 decision, the United States Supreme Court held that 
claims arising under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) may be 
subject toarbitratioripnderthe Federal Arbitration Act. Gilmer involved the interpretation 
of an arbitration provision in a securities industry U-4 fonn, not an employment agreement 
per se. The Supreme Court looked to the text of ADEA and the legislative history, and found 
no barrier to arbitration. Following Gilmer, lower courts began to enforce arbitration 
agreements between employer and employee, using Gilmer to support the presumption 
favoring arbitration of federal and state statutory claims, and claims arising under state 
common law. 
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employees are infonned about the arbitration requirement, or the tenns of 
the arbitration policy. One case which illustrates some of these complexities 
is Walker v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc.,56 decided by the Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals. In Walker, fonner employees filed a complaint 
against Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., (Ryan's) asserting violations of 
the Fair Labor Standards Act, specifically that the employer failed to pay 
them the minimum wage and/or one and one half their regular rate for hours 
worked in excess of forty.57 In response, Ryan's argued that the employees 
were seeking relief in the wrong forum.58 Since the employees had executed 
arbitration agreements during their job application process, or shortly after 
being hired, they were bound to arbitrate all employment-related claims, 
including those of a statutory nature. 59 The district court denied Ryan's 
motion, concluding that there was inadequate consideration for the 
arbitration agreement, the agreements included "hallmarks" of 
unconscionability, and finally, the affected employees did not "knowingly 
and voluntarily" waive their constitutional to a jury trial. 60 In affirming the 
district court's decision not to enforce the arbitration agreements, the Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals reinforced, in even stronger tenns, the need for 
employers to be cautious in how they structure mandatory agreements, in 
particular the need for employers to be cautious in how they structure 
''take-it or leave-it" arbitration provisions embedded m employee 
56.400 F .3d 370 (6th2005). The year before, the Sixth Circuit decided Cooper v. MRM 
Investment Company, 367 F.3d 493 (6th Cir. 2003), in which it reversed the district court's 
decision fmding the arbitration agreement at issue unenforceable on four specific grounds: 
the arbitration agreement was not a contract of adhesion (claimant failed to show that she 
could not locate suitable employment if she refused to sign the agreement), the arbitration 
agreement was neither procedurally nor substantively unconscionable (unequal bargaining 
power alone, which is relevant to the procedural unconscionability analysis, does not render 
a contract substantively unconscionable), the contract was not insufficiently bilateral (both 
parties were required to arbitrate, not just the employee), and the lack of express waiver of 
right to jury trial was inconsequential to the agreement's validity.) As to the fifth 
ground-prohibitively expensive arbitration costs-the Sixth Circuit, relying on Green Tree 
Financial Corp. - Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000) and Morrison v. Circuit City 
Stores Inc., 317 F.3d 646 (6th Cir. 2003) (en bane), agreed with the district court that 
plaintiff may be effectively precluded from accessing the arbitral forum. However, the 
parties in Cooper had agreed to abide by the rules ofthe American Arbitration Association 
("AAA"). Current AAA rules alter the fee schedule for claims arising out of employer-
promulgated plans. Had this case been governed by rules after 2001, this issue would have 
been moot. See American Arbitration Association, available at 
http://www.adr.org/RulesProcedures (last visited Nov. 21, 2006). 
57.Id. at 372-73. 
58. /d. 
59.Id. 
60.Id. 
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handbooks or personnel policies.61 
The appellate court began its analysis by rejecting Ryan's argument that 
state law other than that of Tennessee, which is where the agreements were 
executed and performed, applied, since other plaintiffs from other states 
opted-in to the litigation after suit commenced.62 Relying on Supreme Court 
precedent,63 the Sixth Circuit stated that Ryan's failed to show that 
Tennessee law conflicted with other jurisdictions connected to the suit, a 
prerequisite for finding constitutional prejudice. 64 
The court reserved its more prescient analysis for the balance of 
plaintiffs' arguments, specifically lack of consideration, knowing and 
voluntary waiver of right to sue in federal court, mutuality and 
unconscionable adhesion contracts.65 First, with respect to the consideration 
required to bind plaintiffs' promise to arbitrate, the appellate court, 
invoking Floss, 66 concluded that since the rules and procedures of 
arbitration under which the plaintiffs operated could be altered after 
execution with or without notice, including the rule that allows a plaintiff 
to opt for the earlier promulgated rules that existed at the time of arbitration 
agreement execution, plaintiffs were not obligated to arbitrate their claims.67 
The escape clause negatives any consideration that plaintiffs might 
otherwise receive from Employment Dispute Services, Inc (EDSI).68 
Furthermore, the promise to consider an application, but not necessarily 
employ the applicant, standing alone, is generally not enough to construe 
the arbitration agreement as a binding contract. 69 With respect to the 
knowing and voluntary waiver to file suit in federal court, the Sixth Circuit 
relied on its earlier decision of Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc.,70 in 
61. Id. 
62. /d. at 377-78. 
63. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 821-22 (1985) (holding that "for 
Kansas law to apply to class action by gas company investors seeking to recover interest on 
royalties, Kansas must have a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts . . . 
to ensure that the choice of Kansas law is not arbitrary or unfair."). 
64. Walker, 400 F.3d at 377-78. 
65. Id. at 378-85. 
66. Floss v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 211 F.3d 306 (6th Cir. 2000). 
67. Walker, 400 F.3d at 378-81; see also Smith v. Chrysler Fin. Corp., 101 F. Supp.2d 
(E.D. Mich. 2000) (holding that an agreement that reserves to the employer the right to 
amend, modify, suspend, or tenninate, at any time, all or part of an employee dispute 
resolution process renders the arbitration provision unenforceable under Michigan law). 
68. Walker, 400 F.3d at 379. 
69.Id. at 380-81; see also Geiger v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 134 F. Supp. 
2d 985, 1001 (S.D. Ind. 2001). 
70. Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646 (6th Cir. 2003). 
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which the appellate court articulated a test for such a waiver.71 According 
to Morrison, to detennine whether a plaintiff has knowingly and voluntarily 
waived his or her right to pursue employment claims in federal court, the 
following factors are evaluated: plaintiffs experience, background, and 
education; the amount of time the plaintiff had to consider whether to sign 
the waiver, including whether the employee had an opportunity to consult 
with a lawyer; the clarity of the waiver; consideration of the waiver; and the 
totality of the circumstances.72 
In Walker, the circumstances strongly suggested that plaintiffs did not 
meet the above requirements. Many of the plaintiffs had not completed high 
school, thus, they lacked the sophistication to comprehend the nature of that 
which they signed.73 Also, the hiring process was fairly schizophrenic in 
nature. Some plaintiffs were hired on the spot after a brief interview; others 
were subjected to a more elaborate process.74 For those involved in a shorter 
interview process, the agreements were hurriedly presented, often with little 
infonnation, or misleading infonnation.75 
Next, on the subject of mutual assent, the Sixth Circuit held that the 
arbitration agreement did not result from a meeting of the minds.76 
Although the appellate court acknowledged that this required an objective 
analysis, plaintiffs were not necessarily provided with a copy of the rules 
of arbitration when they executed their agreements.77 Moreover, the 
infonnation provided to employees, and prospective employees, regarding 
arbitration was misleading.78 These factors conspired to move the 
agreements outside the scope of plaintiffs' "reasonable expectations. "79 
Finally, even though the agreements stated that plaintiffs had the right to 
consult with an attorney, in reality, they had no such right.80 Plaintiffs were 
required to sign during the interview process, or forego consideration of 
their application. 81 Given the socio-economic backgrounds of most 
71. !d. at 668. 
72. !d. 
73. Walker, 400 F.3d at 381. 
74.Id. at 381-82. 
75. !d. The Sixth Circuit rejected the district court's third justification for finding an 
insufficient waiver, specifically that the waiver provision stated that an employee must 
resolve employment claims through the arbitral forum and "not through litigation in state 
or federal court." Id. at 382. To the Sixth Circuit, this language was adequate enough to put 
employees on notice that the litigation forum was essentially off-limits. Id. 
76. !d. at 383. 
77. Walker, 400 F.3d at 383. 
78. !d. 
79. !d. at 383-84. 
80. !d. at 382. 
81. Id. at 381-82. 
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plaintiffs, this was the functional equivalent of no right at all. 82 
The final point addressed by the Sixth Circuit pertained to 
unconscionability, and what is commonly referred to as "effective 
vindication of rights.'>83 In plain words, this means that a party who is 
required to arbitrate must be able to access arbitration, and must be assured 
that the arbitral forum provides unbiased decision-making.84 Here, the Sixth 
Circuit focused on the nature of the arbitration panel. 85 Under the process 
established by EDSI, three separate pools of arbitrators, along with 
biographical information with respect to each candidate, were provided to 
the parties upon notification that a claim had been filed.86 These pools were 
created by EDSI, with assistance from an external administrative agency.87 
The first of the pools consisted of supervisors and managers from another 
EDSI signatory company, the second consisted of employees from another 
signatory, and the third was comprised of attorneys, retired judges, and 
other "competent legal professional persons not associated with either 
party. ,,88 Relying on Floss, the appellate court held that this selection 
process was flawed. 89 
As a practical note for practitioners, courts generally will uphold 
arbitration agreements, even those that are mandated by the employer as a 
condition of hire, or a condition of retention, as long as certain requirements 
are met. These requirements include notice, access to the forum, and the 
82.Id. 
83. Walker, 400 F.3d at 384-88. 
84. Id. at 386. 
85. See Walker, 400 F.3d at 385-88. 
86.Id. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. at 386. 
89. Id. at 386-88. This identical process was at issue in Floss, where the Sixth Circuit 
stated, 
We have serious reservations as to whether the arbitral forum provided under the 
current version of the EDSI Rules and Procedures is suitable for the resolution 
statutory claims. Specifically, the neutrality of the forum is far from clear in light 
of the uncertain relationship between Ryan's and EDSI. [Plaintiffs] Floss and 
Daniels suggest that EDSI is biased in favor of Ryan's and other employers 
because it has a fmancial interest in maintaining its arbitrations service contracts 
with employers. Though the record does not clearly reflect whether EDSI, in 
contrast to the American Arbitration Association, operates on a for-profit basis, 
the potential for bias exists. In light of EDSI's role in determining the pool of 
potential arbitrators, any such bias would render the arbitral forum fundamentally 
unfair. 
Floss, 211 F.3dat 314. See also Cole v. Burns Int'I Security Services, 105 F.3d 1465,1482 
(D.C. Cir. 1997) (stating "At a minimum, statutory rights include both a substantive 
protection and access to a neutral forum in which to enforce those protections."). 
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ability to participate in the selection of the arbitrator (not controlled by the 
employer), and the ability to participate fully in the arbitration (e.g., 
presenting witnesses, cross-examining witnesses, securing discovery). 
A case decided during this Survey period which best illustrates the 
willingness of courts to uphold arbitration agreements, provided they are 
procedurally and substantively fair, is Shadeh v. Circuit City Stores. 90 
Shadeh began employment with Circuit City in 1996.91 At time of hire, he 
signed an employment agreement that contained an arbitration clause, 
specifying that the rules of the National Arbitration and Mediation Service 
would apply in the event of a dispute. 92 The arbitration clause contained an 
opt-out provision, which Shadeh did not sign.93 Subsequently, Shadeh filed 
suit in Kentucky district court, alleging race discrimination, disparate 
treatment, wrongful discharge, and retaliation.94 He argued that the Dispute 
Resolution Agreement (DRA) was not fair, and thus not binding.95 
The federal district court upheld the arbitration agreement, rejecting the 
employee's argument that the DRA was unconscionable due to the unequal 
bargaining positions of the parties.96 Under the DRA, which provided 
resolution of all types of disputes including those that sound in Title VII, an 
employee could access the arbitral forum by paying a $75 filing fee. 97 Each 
party participated in the selection of the arbitrator, and each party was 
entitled to discovery. The arbitrator was required to follow the substantive 
law, and was given the discretion to award any remedy deemed appropriate, 
including any remedies available under law.98 
The DRA required Circuit City to pay the arbitrator's fees and costs of 
arbitration, unless the arbitrator assessed such fees against the employee. 99 
In this instance, the employee's fmancial responsibility was capped at either 
$500, or three percent of the annual compensation, whichever was 
greater. loo These terms, taken as a whole, rendered the DRA conscionable, 
thus enforceable. 101 
90. Shadeh v. Circuit City Stores, 334 F. Supp. 2d 938 (W.D. Ky. 2004). 
91. Id. at 939. 
92.Id. 
93./d. 
94.Id. 
95. See id. at 941-44. 
96. Shadeh, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 944. 
97.Id. at 939. 
98. /d. at 940. 
99.Id. 
100.Id. 
101. Id. at 941, 944. 
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N. ARBITRAL AWARDS 
A. Enforcement 
As a general proposition in arbitration, awards rendered by arbitrators 
are final and binding, subject to only limited review under both Michigan 
law 102 and federal law. 103 Review is even more restrictive, not by statute but 
rather by design, in situations dealing with collective bargaining 
agreements. 104 
The above proposition was vividly illustrated in Service Employees 
International Union, Local 466M v. City of Saginaw. 105 Plaintiff was a 
member of the union, and worked for the City of Saginaw (employer) as a 
tax auditor. I06 When a new position of tax specialist was created, plaintiff 
applied for consideration. 107 The position ultimately was awarded to an 
external candidate. 108 Through the grievance machinery, plaintiff grieved, 
asserting that the employer did not properly consider her seniority.l09 An 
102. See Port Huron Area Sch. Dist. v. Port Huron Ed. Ass'n., 426 Mich. 143, 150,393 
N.W.2d 811, 814 (1986). The court stated, 
!d. 
It is well-settled that arbitration is a favored means of resolving labor disputes and 
that courts refrain from reviewing the merits of an arbitration award when 
considering its enforcement. To that extent, judicial review of an arbitrator's 
decision is very limited; a court may not review an arbitrator's factual findings or 
decision on the merits. 
103. See Armco Employees Independent Federation, Inc., v. Armco Steel Co., 65 F.3d 
492,496(6thCir. 1995) ("Case law clearly states that when parties select arbitration tosettle 
their disputes, particularly in labor-management conflicts, district courts are not empowered 
to perform factfinding or second-guessing. Instead, courts have essentially one role-to 
place government authority behind an award in order to enforce it."). 
1 04. Although the statutory bases for vacatur of collective bargaining and non-
collective bargaining awards are the same, as a practical matter courts are less reluctant to 
review labor cases decided by arbitrators because in that arena, the parties have specifically 
bargained for arbitration as a fmal method of dispute resolution. See United Steelworkers 
of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960) ("A major factor in 
achieving industrial peace is the inclusion of a provision for arbitration of grievances in the 
collective bargaining agreement." "Since arbitration of labor disputes has quite different 
functions from arbitration under an ordinary commercial agreement, the hostility evinced 
by courts toward arbitration of commercial agreements has no place here. For arbitration of 
labor disputes under collective bargaining agreements is part and parcel of the coJlective 
bargaining process itself."). 
105. Service Employees International Union, Local 466 v. City of Saginaw, 263 Mich. 
App. 656, 689 N.W.2d 521 (2004). 
106. See id. at 657-60, 689 N.W.2d at 522-24. 
107.Id. 
108. !d. 
109.Id. 
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arbitration hearing was conducted, and the arbitrator's award directed that 
employer award the position to the plaintiff, and to pay her for the interim 
period the difference in pay between that position and her current position 
commencing with the time that the other applicant began employment. 110 
The employer initially complied with the arbitrator's award but then 
reorganized plaintiff's department. III In this reorganization, plaintiff's 
duties were altered, essentially placing plaintiff into the same role she had 
prior to the arbitrator's award. 1I2 The employer re-hired the external 
candidate to assume the position of tax manager.ll3 Duties attendant to this 
position were the original duties of the tax specialist. 1I4 Plaintiff initiated 
suit in circuit court, seeking specific performance and a declaratory 
judgment, alleging that, in violation of the arbitral award, "defendant failed 
and refused to install [her] in the position of Income Tax Specialist."ll5 The 
trial court granted the employer's motion for summary disposition, 
concluding that it did not have jurisdiction to expand or amend the award. 116 
On appeal, the court of appeals agreed with the trial court.ll7 Relying 
on Armco Employees Independent Federation, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., lIS 
the appellate court stated that there is one fact-fmder in arbitration, and that 
is the arbitrator. 119 Thus, it falls within the province of the arbitrator to 
determine if the defendant complied with both the letter and the spirit of the 
original award. 120 Essentially, the court of appeals indicated that the 
allegations in the complaint constituted the basis of a new grievance, which 
by virtue of the parties' collective bargaining agreement, could be processed 
as a separate and new arbitration. 121 
B. Vacatur 
Section 423 is a special statute in Michigan. 122 Enacted in 1969, it 
provides for compulsory arbitration of police and fire labor disputes. 123 The 
110.Id. 
111. Service Employees, 263 Mich. App. at 657-58, 689 N.W.2d at 523. 
112.Id. 
113.Id. 
114.Id. 
115. !d. at 658,689 N.W.2d at 523. 
116.Id. at 658-60, 689 N.W.2d at 523-24. 
117. Service Employees, 263 Mich. App. at 660, 689 N. W.2d at 524. 
118.65 F.3d 492. 
119. Service Employees, 263 Mich. App. at 661-64,698 N.W.2d at 525-26. 
120.Id. 
121. Id. at 662, 689 N.W.2d at 525. 
122. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 423.231-.247 (2001). 
123. As a quid pro quo arbitration, police and fire employees are precluded from 
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Michigan Employment Relations Commission is charged with the 
administration of the statute. 124 
In Police Officers Association of Michigan v. Ottawa County Sheriff, 125 
the Michigan Court of Appeals decided the question of whether an Act 312 
arbitration panel's majority opinion and award, which declined to consider 
the union's last best offer concerning the right to retroactively arbitrate 
grievances, constituted grounds for award vacatur. 126 The collective 
bargaining agreement between the Police Officers Association of Michigan 
(POAM) and the Ottawa County Sheriff (employer) expired on December 
31, 1999.127 On June 5, 2000, POAM filed a petition on behalf of the 
sheriff's deputies, seeking arbitration of fourteen disputed issues. 128 
The arbitration paneP 29 conducted a pre-hearing conference and 
identified these issues to be economic. 130 The panel also identified 
"retroactivity" as an issue. 131 Subsequent to the pre-hearing, the panel 
accepted the employers' offer of settlement, but noted that other issues 
remained open.132 The arbitration panel conducted a hearing on the 
unresolved issues.133 At this hearing, POAM raised the issue of the 
employer's unwillingness to arbitrate grievances that occurred after the 
expiration of the collective bargaining agreement. 134 In its majority opinion 
and award, released in February 2002, the panel declined to consider 
POAM's last best offer concerning the right to retroactively arbitrate 
grievances because "the Act and the rules prohibit a consideration of the 
arbitration-related issues at a time near or at the scheduled arbitration 
striking. M ICH. COMP. LA wsANN. § 423.321, commonly known as Compulsory Arbitration 
of Labor Disputes in Police and Fire Departments, Act 312,1969. Section 1 provides: "It is 
the public policy of this state that in public police ad fire departments, where the right of 
employees to strike is by law prohibited, it is requisite to the high morale of such employees 
and the efficient operation of such departments to afford an alternate, expeditious, effective 
and binding procedure for the resolution of disputes, and to that end the provisions of this 
act, providing for compulsory arbitration, shall be liberally construed." 
124. See MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 423.235 (2001). 
125.264 Mich. App. 133,694 N.W.2d 757 (2004). 
126. !d. at 134-36,694 N.W.2d at 758-59. 
127.Id. at 134,694 N.W.2d at 758. 
128.Id. at 134-35,694 N.W.2d at 758. 
129. Under Act 312, the arbitration panel is comprised of an employer's delegate, an 
employee's delegate, and an impartial delegate from the Michigan Employment Relations 
Commission. MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 423.234 (2001). 
130. POAM, 264 Mich. App. at 135, 694 N.W.2d at 758. 
13!. !d. 
132. !d. 
133.Id. 
134. !d. at 135,694 N.W.2d at 758-59. 
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hearing."135 On appeal, the trial court granted the employer's motion for 
summary disposition. 136 
On reconsideration, the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed and 
remanded, explaining that the plain language of MCL § 423.238 provides 
that the arbitration panel shall identify the economic issues in dispute at or 
before the conclusion of the hearing. 137 Nothing in this language requires 
the issues to be determined before the hearing.138 Indeed, the use of the 
disjunctive "or" indicates that the Legislature intended for arbitration panels 
to determine the economic issues either at the hearing, or before the 
conclusion of the hearing. 139 
The impetus behind the court of appeals' decision was the inability of 
organized employees in the public sector to strike. 14O "Because police and 
fire departments are forbidden from striking, public policy requires an 
"alternate, expeditious, effective and binding procedure for the resolution 
of disputes" to maintain the high morale of the employees and the efficient 
operation of the departments."141 Accordingly, the court of appeals came out 
on the side of liberal construction. 
V. CASE EVALUA nON UNDER MCR 2.403 
In Michigan, a court may order parties to submit their dispute to case 
evaluation under Michigan Court Rule 2.403. 142 Case evaluation in this 
instance is not voluntary. Any civil dispute involving money damages or 
division of property qualifies for the case evaluation process. 143 
In 1994, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that the language ofMCR 
l35. !d. at l35, 694 N.w.2d at 759. 
136. POAM, at 136,694 N.W.2d at 759. 
l37.Id. 
l38.Id. 
l39.Id. 
140. "[S]tatutory language should be construed reasonably, keeping in mind the 
purpose of the act" (relying on Draprop Corp. v. City of Ann Arbor, 247 Mich. App. 410, 
415,636 N.W.2d 787 (2001)) !d. at 138. 
141. Id. at l38, 689 N.W.2d at 760. 
142. Case evaluation was formerly referred to as mediation. In an attempt to eliminate 
confusion with respect to the two processes, the August of2000 court rule revisions altered 
the terminology. Under the revised court rule, mediation is defmed as a facilitative process, 
in which parties reach consensus on a resolution without directive from the neutral. See Rule 
2.411 Mediation. Section (A) (2) states: "Mediation" is a process in which a neutral third 
party facilitates communication between parties, assists in identifying issues, and helps 
explore solutions to promote a mutually acceptable settlement. A mediator has no 
authoritative decision-making power. 
143. MCR 2.403(A) (1). 
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2.403 (at least as then in effect) 144 precluded the awarding of mediation 
sanctions when a matter was resolved by arbitration. 145 The underlying 
rationale was that the language in the court rule "proceeds to trial" did not 
apply to arbitration since arbitration does not constitute a trial. 
During this Survey period, the Michigan Court of Appeals examined the 
impact of a private agreement to arbitrate that incorporated a provision for 
mediation sanctions. In Cusumano v. Velger,146 the parties rejected a case 
evaluation recommendation, subsequent to which they agreed to arbitrate. 147 
Both the court order and the arbitration agreement provided that mediation 
sanctions would apply.148 The arbitrators held for the defendants. 149 On 
application for sanctions, the trial court denied the request, stating that 
under MCR 3.403(0) (7), an arbitration award must be unanimous. 15o 
The court of appeals reversed the trial court's determination, stating that 
by requiring the arbitration decision to be unanimous, the trial court 
inappropriately treated the arbitration decision as a case evaluation award 
rather than a resolution of the case. 151 Under MCR 2.403, a "verdict" does 
not need to be unanimous for sanctions to apply: "An award by two of the 
arbitrators is a fully valid decision with as much force as a unanimous 
award for all purposes, including the application of mediation sanctions."152 
The fact that the arbitrators did not discuss mediation sanctions in their 
award was inconsequential, since the arbitrators' mandate was simply to 
resolve the case on the merits, which they did. 153 Under MCR 3.602(M), 
arbitrator's compensation is a taxable cost in an action, and may be 
recovered as case evaluation sanctions. 154 This rule applies even though the 
court order provided as an initial matter that each party would pay their own 
arbitrator, and each would share equally #1 the payment of the neutral 
arbitrator. 155 Nothing in the statute precludes a prevailing party from 
seeking reimbursement of such payment after the arbitrators render their 
144. In the current version ofMCR 2.403(0) (1), the phrase "proceeds to trial" has 
been replaced with the phrase "proceeds to verdict." 
145. St.George Greek Orthodox Church v. Laupmanis Assn., 204 Mich.App. 278, 514 
N.W.2d 516 (1994). 
146.264 Mich. App. 234, 690 N.W.2d 309 (2004). 
147.Id. at 235,690 N.W.2d at 310. 
148.Id. 
149.Id. 
150.Id. 
151. Id. at 236,690 N.W.2d at 311. 
152. Cusumano, 264 Mich. App. at 236,690 N.W.2d at 311. 
153.Id. at 236-37, 690 N.W.2d at 311. 
154.Id. at 237,690 N.W.2d at 311 [MCR 3.602 is subject to legislative action]. 
155.Id. 
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final decision. 156 
VI. DOMESTIC RELATIONS ARBITRATION 
The Michigan Court of Appeals published two cases during this Survey 
period that interfaces the Child Custody Act CCCA) and the Domestic 
Relations Arbitration Act (DRAA). In the first case, MacIntyre v. 
MacIntyre,157 the appellate court reinforced the pre-eminence of the CCA 
in assessing the best interests of the child. 158 In MacIntyre, the parties 
agreed to binding arbitration159 under the DDRA to resolve various issues, 
including child custody.l60 After conducting a "best interests analysis," the 
arbitrator awarded sole physical custody to plaintiff husband. 161 Defendant 
wife subsequently appealed, seeking vacatur of the portion of the award 
pertaining to custody, and seeking a de novo hearing pursuant to MCL 
§ 600.5080. 162 The trial court reviewed the record, and entered judgment 
consistent with the arbitrator's award. 163 On further appeal, the defendant 
wife claimed that the trial court was required to conduct a de novo hearing, 
and that by reviewing the record of the prior proceeding, the trial court did 
not fulfill its statutory mandate. 164 
In reviewing the trial court's determination de novo, the Michigan 
Court of Appeals agreed. Citing to Harvey v. Harvey,165 the appellate court 
stated that "regardless of the type of alternative dispute resolution that 
parties use, the CCA requires the circuit court to determine independently 
what custodial placement is in the best interests of the children."I66 The 
CCA governs all custody proceedings, whether conducted under the 
auspices of a court or an arbitrator. 167 Thus, when parties to a domestic 
relations dispute agree to proceed under the DRAA, "the court [must] 
156. !d. 
157.264 Mich. App. 690, 692 N.W.2d411 (2005),overrniedin part by, 472 Mich. 882, 
693 N.W.2d 882 (2005). 
158.Id. at 696, 692 N.W.2d at 415. 
159. Theauthorposits that binding arbitration is an oxymoron. Arbitration by defmition 
is binding. To avoid confusion, the author uses the tenninology employed in the court's 
opinion. 
160. MacIntyre, 264 Mich. App. at 692, 692 N.W.2d at 413. 
161. Id. 
162.Id. 
163.Id. 
164.Id. 
165.470 Mich. 186,680 N.W.2d 835 (2004). 
166. MacIntyre, 264 Mich. App. at 694, 692 N.W.2d at 414 (emphasis added). 
167.Id. at 694-95, 692 N.W.2d at 414. 
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satisfy itself concerning the best interests of the children."168 
To be sure, the court of appeals acknowledged the scarcity of the case 
law under the DRAA, enacted in 2001.169 Nonetheless, the appellate court 
made clear, consistent with Harvey, that it is the circuit court that has the 
ultimate power to determine the best interests of the child.170 Such matters, 
which involve "difficult and Solomon-like decisions," require "a full and 
fair hearing by a judge."171 
MacIntyre was preceded by Bayati v. Bayati,172 in which the Michigan 
Court of Appeals held similarly with respect to the issue of child custody. 173 
The parties in Bayati were married in Iran. 174 Defendant ex-wife gave birth 
to twin boys.175 The parties subsequently separated, and plaintiff ex-
husband filed for divorce. 176 After the divorce, the trial court entered several 
temporary custody orders and later entered a consent order for binding 
arbitration. 177 The award granted the parties joint legal custody of the 
children, but gave defendant ex-wife sole physical custody and permitted 
her to remove the children to California. 178 Plaintiff ex-husband moved to 
vacate the award, which was denied by the trial COurt. 179 
The primary issue before the court of appeals was whether the trial 
court erred in failing independently to evaluate the best interests of the 
children regarding the custody award. 180 The appellate court responded in 
168.Id. at 695, 692 N.W.2d at 414. 
169.Id. at 696, 692 N.W.2d at 415. 
170. !d. at 696-97, 692 N.W.2d at 415. 
171.!d; see also Lombardo v. Lombardo, 202 Mich. App. 151, 160, 507N.W.2d 788 
(1993) ("Parties to a divorce judgment cannot by agreement usurp the court's authority to 
determine suitable provisions for the child's best interests."). 
Subsequent to this decision, Leave to Appeal was filed with the Michigan Supreme 
Court. In lieu of granting leave, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed in part, further 
clarifying the requirement ofa formal hearing. MacIntyre, 472 Mich. App. 882, 882, 693 
N.W.2d at 823. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5080(2) requires a "review" of the child 
custody decision. Id. The parties' agreements may not waive the availability of an 
evidentiary hearing if the circuit court determines that a hearing is essential to exercise its 
independent duty under the CCA. Id. Thus, if, as here, the circuit court is able to determine 
independently what custodial placement is in the best interests ofthe children, an evidentiary 
hearing is not required. Id. 
172.264 Mich. App. 595,691 N.W.2d 812 (2004). 
173.Id. 
174.Id. at 596, 691 N.W.2d at 813. 
175.Id. 
176.Id. 
177.Id. 
178. Bayati, 264 Mich. App. at 596-97,691 N.W.2d at 813. 
179. !d. 
180.Id. at 597, 691 N.W.2d at 814. 
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the affmnative. 181 A trial court must make an independent assessment of the 
best interests of the child-this task cannot be delegated to a referee or an 
arbitrator. 182 
Bayati, however, presented two additional issues of note: First, plaintiff 
husband argued that under the terms of the arbitration agreement, the 
arbitrator lacked the authority to decide a change in domicile for the 
children born of the marriage. 183 Even though the consent order was specific 
as to arbitrable issues, it also included a catch-all paragraph.l84 The 
Michigan Court of Appeals held that the consent order did not contain any 
restriction applicable to domicile. 185 Indeed, the order clearly stated that the 
parties could raise any other issue. 186 Since arbitration is generally 
recognized as a matter of contract, terms contained within an arbitration 
agreement must be enforced in the same way as terms in ordinary 
contracts. 187 
Plaintiff husband's second issue was arbitral bias. 188 Plaintiff husband 
claimed that the arbitrator demonstrated bias against Middle Eastern men 
and bias against him personally because he permitted the defendant wife to 
file a late motion to amend the arbitration award. 189 This assertion was 
specifically directed at language in the arbitrator's award as follows: 
With regard to plaintiff, the arbitrator is convinced that he will take 
no positive action to create or maintain a good relationship between 
the minor children and defendant. His testimony reflects 
antagonism, an aura of male dominance as is historic in European 
or Middle Eastern cultures, and plaintiff's generallaizze-faire [sic] 
attitude toward his obligations, in general, and to defendant in 
particular. 190 
181. Id. 
182. [d. 
183. Id. at 598, 691 N.W.2d at 814. 
184. Bayali, 264 Mich. App. at 598, 691 N.W.2d at 814 (stating, "[a]ny other issues 
properly raised by the parties which would otherwise be within the jurisdiction of the circuit 
court"). 
185. [d. at 599, 691 N.W.2d at 815. 
186. [d. 
187. Id;see Rowry v. University of Michigan, 441 Mich. 1,10, 490 N.W.2d 305, 308 
(1992); see a/so Arntower v. William C. Roney & Co., 232 Mich. App. 226, 234, 590 
N.W.2d 580, 583 (1998) (on remand) (holding that to best effectuate the intentions of the 
parties, arbitration agreements must be enforced according to their terms). 
188. Bayati, 264 Mich. App. at 600, 691 N.W.2d at 815. 
189. Id. 
190. Id. 
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Although the court of appeals questioned the wisdom of the 
characterizations used, the court concluded that the comment did not rise to 
the level of true bias:91 The court stated, "[ w ]hile we must be cognizant of 
ethnic stereotyping, we cannot let our caution blind us to actual historic 
tradition."192 In other words, the arbitrator recognized a feature of conduct 
endemic to various cultures that were undeniably true. Merely stating such 
truths do not rise to actual bias. For awards to be overturned on the basis of 
bias, the partiality or bias "must be certain and direct, not remote, uncertain 
or speculative."193 The arbitrator's commentary in this case was simply too 
speculative or vague, and thus insufficient to justify vacatur under Michigan 
law. 194 
One other case decided during this Survey period involved the 
construction of Michigan's DRAA. In Miller v. Miller,195 after several 
unsuccessful efforts to resolve contentious issues in a divorce matter, the 
trial court entered a stipulated order for binding arbitration. 196 The arbitrator 
convened the parties, and attempted to resolve the case by shuttle 
diplomacy, essentially a form of mediation. 197 According to the wife, the 
arbitrator told her that if the 'arbitration' was not completed that day he 
would use the initial session as a fact-finding or mediation session, and if 
unsuccessful, he would schedule later dates for an arbitral hearing. 198 The 
wife asked for a future date in which she could present witnesses and cross-
examine the defendant; however the arbitrator set no such date. 199 The 
arbitrator later produced an "arbitral award," disposing of the outstanding 
issues.2OO Plaintiff filed suit, asserting that the arbitrator violated MeL 
§ 600.5070, which mandates a hearing.201 The trial court affirmed the 
191. !d. at 601,691 N.W.2d at 816. 
192. !d. 
193.Id 
194. Bayati, 264 Mich. App. at 601, 691 N.W.2d at 816. 
195. 264 Mich. App.497, 691 N.W.2d788 (2004),rev'dby474 Mich. 27, 707N.W.2d 
341 (2005). On December 28,2005, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed the Court of 
Appeals decision, holding that the DRAA does not require the formality of a hearing. The 
Court stated that a procedure in which an arbitrator shuttles back and forth between the 
parties, even though not akin to traditional arbitration, satisfies the requirements of DRAA. 
The Michigan Supreme Court reinstated the arbitrator's award and the judgment of divorce 
entered by the circuit court. The author will discuss this case more fully in the 2006 ADR 
Survey Article, forthcoming. 
196.Id. 
197.Id. at 498,691 N.W.2d at 789. 
198.Id. at 500-01, 691 N.W.2d at 790. 
199.Id. at 501, 691 N.W.2d at 790-91. 
200.Id. at 502, 691 N.W.2d at 791. 
201. Miller, 264 Mich. App at 502, 691 N.W.2d at 791. 
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award. 202 On further appeal, a divided panel of the Michigan Court of 
Appeals held that DRAA requires a formal hearing.203 To support the 
decision, the appellate court first examined the hearing requirement 
provision, likening it to a "proceeding of relative formality with definite 
issues of fact or of law to be tried much the same as a trial.'>204 The court of 
appeals explained: 
Under the clear, mandatory language of the DRAA, litigants who 
give up the numerous rights afforded by general litigation in circuit 
court and instead choose binding arbitration to adjudicate their 
domestic relations claims are afforded basic, protective rights, the 
most important of which is a full and fair hearing. Here, this 
essential statutory right was neither waived nor provided, and 
therefore, we reverse the trial court's erroneous refusal to set aside 
the "arbitral award. '>205 
In reaching this decision, the Court of Appeals emphasized the importance 
of the DRAA 206 For years, arbitration of domestic relations matters was 
conducted under general statutes and court rules. 207 Until Dick v. Dick,208 
case law did not provide guidelines.209 The Legislature responded by 
promulgating DRAA, which established unambiguous procedures and 
safeguards for fair arbitral hearings.2IO 
In the face of this strong legislative direction with the purpose of 
ensuring fair hearings for domestically related parties who choose 
arbitration, a trial court must overturn any award in which the arbitrator has 
202.ld. 
203. The only issue the court of appeals decided was whether a domestic relations 
litigant is bound by an "arbitral award" if the arbitrator does not conduct a hearing, but 
instead meets with the parties ex parte to settle the case. The court did not decide a second 
spin-off issue, and that is the question of whether a stipulated order satisfies the requirement 
under the DRAA that parties who agree to binding arbitration should do so "by a signed 
agreement that specifically provides for an award" regarding delineated issues. See M ICH. 
COMP. LA ws ANN. § 600.5071 (2000). 
204. Miller, 264 Mich. App. at 498 n.2, 691 N.W.2d at 789, quoting BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY (rev. 4th ed. 1968); citing In re Marriage of Fine, 452 N.E.2d 691,677 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1983). 
205. Miller, 264 Mich. App. at 500,691 N.W.2d at 790. 
206.ld. at 504, 691 N.W.2d at 792. 
207.ld. at 502, 691 N.W.2d at 791. 
208. 210 Mich. App.576, 534 N.W.2d 185 (1995) (holding that parties may stipulate 
to using binding arbitration to resolve issues of child custody). 
209. Miller, 264 Mich. App. at 502-03,691 N.W.2d at 791. 
21O.1d. at 503, 691 N.W.2d at 791. 
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denied either party the statutory right to a hearing. It would be contrary to 
the letter and sprit of the DRAA to mandate that courts vacate arbitral 
awards when arbitrators unfairly denied parties' requests for adjournment, 
unfairly refused to hear evidence, or unfairly conducted the hearing, but to 
nonetheless affirm awards when parties are denied their right to any hearing 
whatsoever.2l1 Here, the arbitrator's efforts ·at settlement "mimicked the 
procedure known as mediation," not arbitration, thus, the resulting award 
could not stand. 212 
Miller's dissent focused on the absence of a specific formulae within 
DRAA as to what, in fact, constitutes a hearing.213 Judge Kelly explained 
that the very nature of "judicial review" of arbitral awards is such that there 
is no record from which to determine what transpires during arbitration.214 
Since the word "hearing" in the statute is left undefined, and since the 
parties here agreed to use arbitration to resolve their differences, their 
agreement should have been enforced.215 
There are two problems with this analysis: first, "hearing" is 
presumably left undefined because it is a term of common usage. 216 
American Arbitration Association rules, for example, differentiate between 
evidentiary hearings and hearings on documents.217 The former requires 
convening a formal session, having an arbitrator take an oath of office, 
presenting witnesses, cross-examining witnesses, and having a final 
opportunity to put in written proofs.218 While this practice can be varied 
somewhat, the essence of hearing can still be maintained. The second 
concern is that the parties did not execute an arbitration agreement. 219 The 
trial court simply prepared an order, directing the parties into arbitration.220 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This Survey period's decisions as a whole have solidified or refined 
areas of ADR jurisprudence, and provided clarity in areas previously 
211. Id. at 506-507, 691 N.W.2d at 793. 
212.Id. at 502, 691 N.W.2d at 791 (Kelly, J., dissenting). 
213.Id. at 513, 691 N.W.2d at 797 (Kelly, J., dissenting). 
214.Id. at 514-15, 691 N.W.2d at 797 (Kelly, J., dissenting). 
215. Miller, at 514-15, 691 N.W.2d at 797-98 (Kelly, J., dissenting). 
216. See generally Miller, 264 Mich. App. 497, 691 N.W.2d 788. 
217. See, e.g., Impartial Umpire Rules for Arbitration ofImpasses Trustees of Joint 
Employee Benefit Trust Funds, American Arbitration Association, available at 
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22111 (last visited Dec. 20, 2006). 
218.Id. 
219. Miller, 264 Mich. App. at 505, 691 N.W.2d at 790. 
220.Id. 
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dominated by murky decision-making. First, the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals issued a strong warning to employers who seek to craft mandatory 
arbitration agreements (Walker). To be enforceable, such agreements must 
be both procedurally and substantively conscionable. Practitioners here 
should not assume that a reviewing court will excise the offending 
provision(s). If glaringly void of due process, the agreements simply will 
not be enforced. Second, the Michigan courts continue to demonstrate their 
strong support of arbitration by refusing to disturb arbitral agreements 
entered into at arms length, without a showing of factors that would 
otherwise vitiate consent (Shadeh). Third, in terms of award enforcement, 
Michigan courts also continue to take the position that the arbitrator, not the 
court, is the exclusive fact-finder. Only in the most egregious of 
circumstances will an arbitral award be overturned (City of Saginaw). 
In the context of domestic relations, the Michigan Court of Appeals 
articulated a strong caveat to ADR neutrals that by failing to follow the 
strict requirements of DRAA, an arbitral award may be set aside (Miller). 
Next, in the area of court-annexed mediation, the Michigan Court of 
Appeals offered strict guidelines in terms of sanctions, specifically, how 
sanctions are calculated, when they may be sought, and how to get around 
the special nuances of the case evaluation rule (Cusumano). And fmally, the 
Michigan Court of Appeals sharpened its construction of the Child Custody 
Act; independent assessments are required, and such as sessments remain 
within the purview of the circuit courts (MacIntyre and Bayati). All in all, 
these decisions provide practitioners with a useful toolbox to ably represent 
clients in ADR, and to further the primary goal of 'justice' in ADR. 
VIII. APPENDIX 
The following is a summary of selected unpublished cases covering the 
Survey period. Some cases include multiple holdings but the Author has 
highlighted only those cases and holdings that primarily clarify existing 
law, or reinforce the law in areas of ADR jurisprudence where case law is 
scant. 
Allstate Insurance Co. v. Davis-Buyck, unpublished opinion per curiam 
of the Michigan Court of Appeals, decided January 4, 2005 (Docket No. 
250490),2005 WL 17847. Trial court's decision to re-open an arbitration 
proceeding after an award had been rendered was reversed, where the re-
opening occurred simply because a party discovered an unresolved issue. 
In Michigan, public policy favors the finality of arbitration awards, and 
once an arbitrator's award is rendered, it generally cannot be re-examined. 
American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees 
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Council 25, Local 2724 v. Marquette County Road Commission, 
unpublished opinion per curiam of the Michigan Court of Appeals, decided 
January 4, 2005 (Docket No. 250490), 2004 WL 2951955. Trial court's 
decision which vacated an arbitrator's award was affirmed where the 
arbitrator found just cause for grievant's termination under the employer's 
drug and alcohol consumption policy, but nonetheless proceeded to modify 
the discipline imposed by management. Once an arbitrator determines that 
just cause exists, he has no authority to modify the discipline imposed. The 
arbitrator exceeded his authority. Also a strong dissent by Justice Borrello, 
challenging the majority's conclusion that the arbitrator found just cause to 
discipline the grievant. In labor arbitration, the arbitrator, and not the courts, 
interprets and applies the agreement. The decision of the majority was an 
attempt to review the merits of the underlying claim. This goes against the 
presumption that an award, once rendered, is within the scope of the 
arbitrator's authority. 
Brandon Associates v. Castle Management, unpublished opinion per 
curiam of the Michigan Court of Appeals, decided November 18, 2004 
(Docket No. 247192), 2004 WL 2624758. Trial court's decision granting 
defendants' summary disposition was reversed where the plaintiff in 
litigation was not a party to an earlier arbitration, thus the twin doctrines of 
res judicata and collateral estoppel did not apply. 
Capitol City Lodge 141 Fraternal Order of Police v. Eaton County Bd. 
of Commissioners, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Michigan Court 
of Appeals, decided June 17, 2004 (Docket No. 246570), 2004 WL 
1366039. Trial court's decision to enforce arbitral award affirmed where the 
arbitrator, in construing the parties' collective bargaining agreement, went 
outside the four comers of the contract, and considered past practices to 
address an ambiguity. "[R]eview of an arbitration award is 'narrowly 
circumscribed' and limited to determining whether the arbitration award 
exceed the arbitrator's contractual authority." The arbitrator acted within his 
prescribed contractual powers. 
City of Detroit v. Detroit Lieutenants' and Sergeants' Ass 'n., 
unpublished opinion per curiam of the Michigan Court of Appeals, decided 
February 17, 2005 (Docket No. 250424), 2005 WL 387647. Trial court's 
decision not to enforce arbitral award was reversed and remanded where 
arbitrator considered evidence that was not presented at the arbitration 
hearing but which was authorized by the Master Agreement governing his 
authority. Moreover, the trial court erred in vacating the award on the basis 
of public policy. "Michigan has a limited public policy exception to the 
general rule of judicial deference to arbitrator's award." Further, "[t]he 
public policy exception is construed narrowly and authorizes vacating an 
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arbitrator's award where it "would violate some explicit public policy that 
is well-defmed and dominant, ... ascertained by reference to the laws and 
legal precedent and not from general considerations of supposed public 
interest." Thus, an officer who engages in prohibitive behavior during the 
course of his employment does not run afoul of the public policy exception 
unless the law prohibits his reinstatement). 
Fritz v. Rader, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Michigan Court 
of Appeals, decided November 30, 2004 (Docket No. 250201), 2004 WL 
2726054. Trial court's decision to enter judgment on a mediation award was 
reversed where defendant's conditional acceptance of the mediation 
evaluation should have been treated as a rejection and where the mediation 
evaluation left unresolved a material factual issue between the parties. 
Gesing v. City of Warren, unpublished opinion per curiam of the 
Michigan Court of Appeals, decided June 22, 2004 (Docket No. 244501), 
2004 WL 1392285. Trial court's decision granting defendant summary 
disposition of plaintifPs Whistleblowers' Protection Act claim affirmed 
where plaintiff was not able to demonstrate that his termination was actually 
triggered by testimony he was to provide in an Act 312 proceeding. Plaintiff 
cited no authority that such a proceeding constituted a report to a public 
body under MCL § 1.361(d)). 
Ironwood Area Schools v. Ironwood Educ. Ass 'n, unpublished opinion 
per curiam of the Michigan Court of Appeals, decided December 16, 2004 
(Docket No. 249686), 2004 WL 2913587. Trial court's decision granting 
plaintiffs' summary disposition was reversed where such ruling exceeded 
the court's permissible scope of review. The court stated: 
It is well-settled that arbitration is a favored means of resolving 
labor disputes and that courts refrain from reviewing the merits of 
an arbitration award when considering its enforcement. To that 
extent, judicial review of an arbitrator's decision is very limited; a 
court may not review an arbitrator's factual findings or decision on 
the merits. 
Lawrence M Clarke, Inc. v. SMRT, L.L. c., unpublished opinion per 
curiam of the Michigan Court of Appeals, decided May 3, 2005 (Docket 
No. 250671), 2005 WL 1027068. Trial court's decision refusing to award 
pre-judgment interest was proper. Relying on Holloway Constr. Co. v. 
Oakland County. Ed. of Rd. Comm'rs., 450 Mich. 608, 543 N.W.2d 923 
(1996), the court of appeals stated that the decision whether to award pre-
award interest as an element of damages is within the arbitrator's province. 
As to the issue of post-award interest, the trial court erred when it 
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calculated such interest at the rate of five percent under MCL § 438.7. In 
Michigan, post-award or post-judgment interest is governed by MCL 
§§ 600.6013(6) and (8». 
Leonard v. Art Van Furniture, Inc., unpublished opinion per curiam of 
the Michigan Court of Appeals, decided June 8, 2004 (Docket No. 243139), 
2004 WL 1254330. Trial court's decision denying defendant's motion to 
arbitrate and for summary disposition was reversed where the employee, 
once hired by defendant, was bound to arbitrate all employment disputes. 
However, the Michigan Court of Appeals also rejected plaintiff's 
characterization that the parties' pre-dispute arbitration agreement was not 
statutory but rather common law. Since the language in the agreement 
contained reference to enforceability, as required by Michigan law, the 
agreement was statutory, thus, not unilaterally revocable. 
Leone v. Mika Systems, Inc., unpublished opinion per curiam of the 
Michigan Court of Appeals, decided November 23, 2004 (Docket No. 
249963), 2004 WL 2674216. Trial court's portion of decision holding that 
a 180-day contractual limitation period was invalid as a matter of law was 
reversed where the parties by contract stipulated to a shorter limitation 
period and such shortened limitation period was reasonable. 
Melvindale-Northern Allen Park Public Schools v. AFSCME Local 
1523, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Michigan Court of Appeals, 
decided October 28,2004 (Docket No. 248880), 2004 WL 2413367. Award 
of arbitrator reinstating grievant to his former position affirmed where the 
arbitrator determined plaintiff had discriminated in the application of 
disciplinary procedures for violation of substance abuse policy by retaining 
one employee but firing grievant. Such an award does not violate the public 
policy exception doctrine. For an award to contravene public policy, the 
arbitrator's award must mandate illegal conduct or require plaintiff to act 
unlawfully, and here it did neither. 
Prose v. Sun and Ski Marina, unpublished opinion per curiam of the 
Michigan Court of Appeals, decided December 9, 2004 (Docket No. 
245823), 2004 WL 2827197. Trial court's decision to award mediation 
sanctions was reversed and remanded for evidentiary hearing when 
challenged with respect to its decision, because it failed to conduct an 
evidentiary hearing with respect to the amount of attorney fees and failed 
to explain its ruling. 
Real Estate One, Inc. v. American Arbitration Assn, unpublished 
opinion per curiam of the Michigan Court of Appeals, decided February 1, 
2005 (Docket No. 249970),2005 WL 233554. Award of sanctions imposed 
by trial court was affirmed where defendant failed to comply with multiple 
orders to appear to show cause hearings--even though American 
HeinOnline -- 52 Wayne L. Rev. 352 2006
352 THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:325 
Arbitration Association was not a proper party and may have been entitled 
to quasi-judicial immunity as a sponsoring organization of arbitrations. The 
potential cloak: of immunity does not shield a party who violates (seemingly 
flagrantly) court orders to appear. 
Robinson v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., unpublished opinion per curiam 
of the Michigan Court of Appeals, decided June 22, 2004 (Docket No. 
247752), 2004 WL 1393768. Circuit court order granting summary 
disposition in favor of defendants was reversed, holding that a party who 
raises arbitration as an affirmative defense in a responsive pleading without 
first filing a motion for summary disposition, and who actively engages in 
litigation through discovery, pretrial and mediation, has effectively waived 
the right to invoke arbitration. 
Studio B Architects, Inc. v. Metaldyne, unpublished opinion per curiam 
of the Michigan Court of Appeals, decided October 12, 2004 (Docket No. 
248017),2004 WL 2291348. Trial court's decision was affirmed where the 
arbitrator, and not the courts, decided the application of contractual 
defenses, such as contractual limitation periods, statutes of limitation and 
laches. 
Thumb Electric Cooperative of Michigan v. Walker, unpublished 
opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, decided September 28, 2004 
(Docket No. 247523), 2004 WL 2177130. Trial court's decision denying 
defendant's motion for post-judgment interest on an arbitration award 
affirmed where the arbitration panel did not award interest. When parties 
provide for arbitration, the decision to award interest falls within the 
discretion of the arbitrator. A circuit court cannot usurp this jurisdiction. 
TI Group Automotive Systems, Inc. v. Millennium Industries Corp. 
unpublished opinion per curiam of the Michigan Court of Appeals, decided 
January 11, 2005 (Docket No. 250538), 2005 WL 50189. Trial court's 
decision not to review arbitral transcript to determine whether the arbitrator 
exceeded his powers affirmed. First, the transcript was not presented to the 
trial court for consideration. Second, the lower court's ruling is consistent 
with Michigan law, specifically, DAIlE v. Gavin, 416 Mich. 407, 331 
N.W.2d 418 (1982), which held that for an award to be overturned, it must 
be clearly evident from the face of the award that, through a material or 
substantial error of law, the arbitrator was led to an incorrect conclusion. 
See also Welsh v. Welsh, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of 
Appeals, decided February 15, 2005 (Docket No. 250716) 2005 WL 
356638. Arbitrator did not exceed his authority where a portion of the 
award granted relief that would typically not be granted in a court of law, 
and the award did not contravene the controlling principles of law. "[T]he 
fact that the relief granted in an arbitration award could not be granted by 
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a court of law or equity is not grounds for vacating the award." See MICH. 
COMPo LAW ANN. § 600.5081(3). 
Township of Clay V. Montville, unpublished opinion per curiam of the 
Michigan Court of Appeals, decided June 17, 2004 (Docket No. 248293), 
2004 WL 1366063. Award was affirmed where arbitrator ruled that the 
demotion grievant received under the progressive disciplinary provision of 
the collective bargaining agreement was excessive, notwithstanding the fact 
that grievant had committed the infraction for which he was charged. The 
collective bargaining agreement provided the arbitrator with sufficient 
latitude to determine that while an employee is guilty of violating an 
express provision of the contract, such a violation is not just cause for the 
discipline imposed, and the arbitrator may impose a less severe penalty. 
Ultimate Precision, Inc. V. International Marketing Consultants, Inc., 
unpublished opinion per curiam of the Michigan Court of Appeals, decided 
June 15, 2004 (Docket No. 246606), 2004 WL 1335902. Trial court's 
decision denying plaintiff's motion to vacate arbitral award and confirming 
the award affirmed where arbitrator acted properly in construing ambiguous 
language, since a determination of the parties' intent involves questions of 
fact that is not subject to appellate review. 
Willis V. Stevens, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Michigan Court 
of Appeals, decided October 19, 2004 (Docket No. 254656), 2004 WL 
2348256. Trial court's decision granting plaintiff's motion for change of 
custody was affirmed where trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
changing custody of the parties' minor children from defendant to plaintiff. 
Under Michigan law, even when parties stipulate to use arbitration to 
resolve custody issues, they cannot similarly by stipulation limit a trial 
court's authority to review custody determinations, since to do so would 
"nullify the protections of the Child Custody Act and relieve the circuit 
court of its statutorily imposed responsibilities," citing to Harvey V. Harvey 
470 Mich. 186,680 N.W.2d 835 (2004). 
Wold Architects and Engineers, Inc. V. Strat, unpublished opinion per 
curiam of the Michigan Court of Appeals, decided June 17, 2004 (Docket 
No. 246874), 2004 WL 1366060. Trial court's decision to enforce an 
arbitration agreement was erroneous, as the agreement lacked the requisite 
statutory language of enforceability. This failure essentially converts the 
agreement to common law, entitling the plaintiff to unilaterally revoke 
consent to arbitrate. "Statutory arbitration provisions . . . are irrevocable 
except by mutual consent." 
Zurkowski V. Valentine, unpublished opinion per curiam of the 
Michigan Court of Appeals, decided April 7, 2005 (Docket No. 251471), 
2005 WL 782685. Trial court's decision to enforce award affirmed where 
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the arbitration panel considered the evidence submitted by plaintiff but 
failed to give it the weight plaintiff claimed it deserved. "[W]hile a refusal 
to hear material evidence is a basis for review, a refusal to give weight to 
evidence is not." 
